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I. INTRODUCTION
Upton Sinclair famously commented about his 1906 novel
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The Jungle, which was based on his undercover investigation of
the inhumane conditions of Chicago’s slaughterhouse workers,
that he “aimed at the public’s heart, and by accident I hit it in the
stomach.”1 The public was far more disgusted by the way their
food was being handled, rather than the conditions of the
workers.2 Today, similarly, animal rights activists are looking to
draw attention to the inhumane treatment of animals by
conducting undercover investigations to expose animal abuse
and mistreatment.3 However, these activists are being met with
state laws criminalizing undercover investigation at agricultural
facilities, also known as “ag-gag laws.”4 Many of these state
laws would have exposed Sinclair and his groundbreaking
investigation of the meat packing industry to criminal liability.5
And while animal rights activists may be looking to aim for the
public’s hearts with their investigation, the response by
agricultural interest groups may very well be creating a
constitutional free speech issue.
In 2012, Mercy for Animals released a film by undercover
investigators, showing Idaho dairy farm workers abusing cows.6
The video showed the workers repeatedly beating, kicking, and
jumping on cows, as well as dragging one cow across the floor
by a chain attached to its neck.7 Idaho charged the workers with
1. Upton Sinclair, What Life Means to Me, 41 COSMOPOLITAN MAGAZINE 591, 594
(1906) available at
http://dlib.nyu.edu/undercover/sites/dlib.nyu.edu.undercover/files/documents/uploads/edito
rs/WhatLifeMeansToMe.pdf.
2. Adam Cohen, 100 Years Later, the Food Industry Is Still the ‘The Jungle’, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 2, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/opinion/02tue4.html.
3. Jesse Paul, Colorado authorities investigating dairy cow abuse video; worker
fired, DENVER POST (Jun. 11, 2015),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28295679/colorado-authorities-investigating-dairyplant-abuse-video-workers.
4. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime, NEW YORK
TIMES (Apr. 6 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-isbecoming-the-crime.html.
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42 (West 2015).
6. Arin Greenwood, Court Says No To Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/idaho-aggag-law_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543.
7. Lorene D. Park J.D., Criminalizing whistleblower activity in ‘ag gag’ law violated
free speech ad equal protection rights, EMPLOYMENTLAWDAILY.COM,
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/criminalizing-whistlebloweractivity-in-agricultural-industry-violated-free-speech-and-equal-protection-rights/
(last
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misdemeanors of animal cruelty.8 Instead of looking to curb
future animal abuse, Idaho responded by passing a law in 2014,
drafted by the Idaho Dairymen’s Association,9 criminalizing
unauthorized video recordings at agricultural production
facilities,
as
well
as
obtaining
employment
by
misrepresentation.10
In the recent U.S. District Court case, Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter, an Idaho judge struck down Idaho’s
law.11 This is the first instance a federal court has struck down
an “ag-gag law.”12 The court found that Idaho’s law violated
both the constitutional rights to free speech and equal
protection.13 They reasoned it violated free speech because the
law criminalized a form of protected speech, and was both a
content-based and viewpoint based-discrimination.14 The court
also determined that the Idaho statute violated equal protection
because it created a distinction between whistleblowers in the
agricultural industry to those of other industries, and was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose.15
ALDF v. Otter establishes a strong precedent that casts
doubt upon many similar laws in other states. Currently,
Montana, Utah, North Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa and
Wyoming have laws in place that in one or another criminalizes
undercover investigations of agricultural facilities.16
North Carolina has also passed a bill that will be effective

visited Nov. 2 2015).
8. Rebecca Boone, Dairy workers accused of beating, stomping cows in video,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.kboi2.com/news/local/Idaho-Dairy-CowsMercy-Animals-173483161.html.
9. Luke Runyon, Judge Strikes Down Idaho ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, Raising Questions For
Other States, NPR.ORG (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/08/04/429345939/idaho-strikes-down-ag-gaglaw-raising-questions-for-other-states.
10. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42
11. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943
at *4 (D. Idaho 2015)
12. Dan Flynn, Federal Judge in Boise Strikes Down Idaho’s New ‘Ag-Gag’ Law,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/08/federaljudge-in-boise-strikes-down-idahos-new-ag-gag-law/#.VhA7r_lVhBc.
13. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *4.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ag-Gag Legislation by State, ASPCA.ORG, https://www.aspca.org/animalprotection/public-policy/ag-gag-legislation-state (last visited Mar. 15 2016).
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January 1, 2016, providing for the civil recovery of damages by
an employer when any employee makes an audiovisual
recording and uses that recording to breach the employee’s duty
of loyalty to the employer.17 Notably, this bill is not specific to
the agricultural industry.18 North Carolina, along with
Wyoming,19 have established the newest trend in prohibiting
undercover recording by restricting it on any private property,
regardless of industry. Compared to its predecessors, these broad
bans to data collection present a different kind of problem to
those seeking to challenge these laws.
Part I of this analysis describes the laws or proposed laws
which seek to prevent undercover investigation of animal
production facilities. Part II further unpacks the Otter ruling.
Part III applies and evaluates the cases ruling and reasoning to
other state’s statutes to determine how they would fare under
such analysis. Part IV explores and evaluates the law
surrounding the broad data collection bans in North Carolina.
II. HISTORY OF “AG-GAG” LAWS
“Ag-gag laws” come in many different forms, but all
generally aimed at preventing undercover investigators from
making audiovisual recordings at agricultural facilities. This
section explores how the efforts to limit undercover
investigation on agricultural facilities have changed overtime.
A. The First Wave: No Recording Statutes – Kansas, North
Dakota, and Montana
In 1990, Kansas became the first state to pass a law
criminalizing undercover recording at animal facilities.20 The
17. H.R. Res. 405 2015-2016 Leg. (N.C. 2015).
18. Id.
19. WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-3-414(a) (West 2015). (“(a) A person is guilty of
trespassing to collect resource data if he: (i) enters onto open land for the purpose of
collecting resource data, and (ii) does not have: (A) An ownership interest in the real
property. . .; or (B)Written or verbal permission from the owner [. . .].”).
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015) (“(c) NO person shall without the
effective consent the owner and with intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the
animal facility: (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or
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statute requires there be “intent to damage the enterprise
conducted at the animal facility.”21 Montana’s 1991 statute also
incorporated this language.22 In addition to requiring intent to
damage, Montana further limited the scope of its statute by also
requiring “intent to commit criminal defamation.”23 Montana’s
defamation standard provides that if “the defamatory matter is
true” or “consist[s] of fair comment made in good faith with
respect to a person participating in matters of public concern”
then the speech is justified.24 These two intent requirements
make Montana’s statute the narrowest in terms of heightened
intent requirements.25
North Dakota’s 1991 statute requires no such intent for
their ag-gag act.26 It plainly criminalizes the unauthorized use or
attempted use of recording equipment, without regard to the
intent or what is being recorded.27 Thus, anyone who records
anything on an animal facility in North Dakota and is not part of
governmental agency carrying out their duties, or has not
obtained the consent of the owner, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.28 Violators may be subject to a max of 30 days in
prison or a fine of $1500, or both.29In practice, a person could be
prosecuted for taking a photo of oneself in the break room of an
animal facility, or any other number of innocuous
circumstances. However, no one has ever prosecuted under any
of these three states’ laws.30

by any other means[.]”).
21. Id.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015).
23. Id.
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(3)(a), (e) (West 2015).
25. Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber L. Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and The Right to Remain Silent Confront State
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 34 (2015).
26. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015).
27. Id. (“No person with the effective consent of the owner. . .6. Enter an animal
facility and use or attempt to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio
recording equipment”).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-04 (West 2015).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (West 2015).
30. Reid, supra note 25, at 37.

2017]

ALDF V. OTTER

203

B. The Second Wave: Forbidding Misrepresentations –
Utah, Idaho, Iowa
“Ag-gag” legislation did not re-emerge again until 2012
when Iowa and Utah passed legislation criminalizing
agricultural interference.31 Idaho followed suit by passing its
own in 2014.32 These laws made it a crime to lie to obtain access
to an agricultural facility.33
Iowa forbids both “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural
operation under false pretenses” and knowingly making a false
statement as part of a job application with an intent to commit an
act not authorized by the owner.34 Thus, Iowa’s ag-gag law takes
a different route from the earlier laws as it does not specifically
target audiovisual recording, only lying to gain access to the
facility. Utah and Idaho took it a step further by not only
including Iowa’s language criminalizing misrepresentations to
gain employment or access, but also prohibited unauthorized
audiovisual recording similar to the first wave statutes.35 The
combination of these provides agricultural production facilities
with two layers of protection. On the front end, it deters animal
rights activists from applying for jobs for the purpose of going
undercover, as they could be subject to criminal liability if the
activists are questioned about their affiliation with animal rights
groups and they conceal such affiliation. Regardless, if activists
31. Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse: Rapid
Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-gag Laws, 48 Colum, J. OF L. & SOC. PROBS. 337,
32. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42 (West 2015).
33. Shea, supra note 31.
34. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015). (“1. A person is guilty of
agricultural facility fraud if the person willfully does any of the following: a. Obtains
access to an agricultural facility by false pretenses. b. Makes a false statement or
representation as part of an application agreement. . . if the person knows the statement to
be false, and makes the statement with an intent to commit an act not authorized by the
owner of the agricultural production facility, knowing that the act is not authorized.”).
35. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015) (“(1) A person commits the crime
of interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly: . . . (c) Obtains
employment with an agricultural by . . . misrepresentation with the intent to cause
economic injury to facility’s operations. . . [.]”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (West
2015) (“(2) A person is guilty of agricultural operation interference if the person: (a)
without consent from the owner. . .records an image [or sound] from the agricultural
operation by leaving a recording device. . .(b) obtains access to an agricultural facility
under false pretenses[.]”).
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are employed, whether under false pretenses or not, they are still
prohibited from filming. This combination likely makes Utah
and Idaho’s ag-gag laws two of the strictest in the nation.
C. The Third Wave: Rapid Reporting – Missouri
Laws forbidding recording or lying to gain access to
agricultural facilities have recently fallen out of favor.36 Many
states proposed ag-gag bills in 2013, but they failed to become
law.37 Animal activists were successful in rallying public
opinion and creating a large and diverse coalition to help defeat
ag-gag laws behind a simple message: “if there is nothing to
hide, why ban the cameras?”38 Additionally, lawmakers
themselves raised concerns as to the constitutionality of
agricultural protectionist laws.39 In response, legislatures have
attempted to pass statues requiring rapid reporting of any
instance of animal abuse. The laws do not explicitly forbid
unauthorized recording of animal abuse, but instead require that
any recorded animal abuse be reported to the appropriate
agency, usually within a 24 to 48 hour timeframe.40 This would
seem to be a good middle ground solution for both parties.
However, the effect is that it becomes next to impossible to
establish a pattern of abuse or neglect, and it enables an
agricultural facilities to say that a particular occurrence of abuse
was just a one-time problem.41
Missouri’s ag-gag law illustrates rapid reporting statutes.
Missouri’s law provides that when anyone makes a digital
recording of a farm animal being abused, there is duty to submit
it to a law enforcement agency within 24 hours.42 Additionally,
it mandates that the recording may not be edited or manipulated

36. Shea, supra note 31, at 346-47
37. Reid, supra note 25, at 40.
38. Shea, supra note 31, at 349-50
39. Id. at 351-352
40. See MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015) (“1. Whenever any farm animal
professional videotapes or otherwise makes a digital recording of what he or or she
believes to depict a farm animal subjected to abuse or neglect. . .such farm animal
professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital recording to a law
enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording.”).
41. Reid, supra note 25
42. MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015)
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in any way.43 Other states which have attempted to enact rapid
reporting bills include Nebraska, California, Tennessee, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, and Arizona.44
D. The Fourth Wave: Broad Restrictions to Data
Collection – North Carolina, Wyoming
The latest trend in agricultural protectionist legislation is
difficult to categorize as such, as it affects far more than the
agricultural industry. North Carolina’s “Property Protection
Act” was passed over Governor Pat McCrory’s veto on June 3,
2015.45 Its purpose is to provide for the recovery of damages for
exceeding the scope of authorized access to property.46 Damages
can be recovered when,
An employee who intentionally enters the nonpublic areas
of an employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide
intent of seeking or holding employment or doing business with
the employer and thereafter without authorization records
images or sound occurring within an employer’s premises and
uses the recording to breach the person’s duty of loyalty to the
employer.47
Under this language, it appears that any employee could be
subject to civil liability for recording at their place of
employment. The bill does not identify any particular industry,
so it appears to be a blanket ban.48 Lawmakers assert that it will
not prevent whistleblowers from reporting illegal activity.49
However, Governor McCrory and other opponents of the bill
believe there is no such adequate protection for honest
employees who uncover illegal activity.50 Activists have
criticized the act as just being a way to disguise an ag-gag bill,51
43. Id.
44. Shea, supra note 31, at 356-61
45. Mark Binker & Laura Leslie, Lawmakers override McCrory veto on
controversial ‘ag-gag’ bill, WRAL.com (Jun. 3, 2015), http://www.wral.com/lawmakersoverride-mccrory-veto-on-controversial-private-property-bill/14687952/
46. H.R. Res. 405 2015-2016 Leg. (N.C. 2015).
47. Id.
48. See Id.
49. Binker & Leslie, supra note 45.
50. Id.
51. Rob Verger, North Carolina’s Ag-Gag Law Might Be the Worst in the Nation,
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and it is worth noting that North Carolina is the second largest
hog producer in the United States, totaling about $2.9 billion
dollars in sales.52 There is also concern that this bill will also
chill abuse reporting in veteran treatment centers, child care
facilities, and nursing homes.53
Wyoming’s statute, which became effective March 5,
2015,54 is similarly broad in its language. Wyoming makes it
unlawful to collect resource data on private open land.55 Open
land is defined as “land outside the exterior boundaries of an
incorporated city, town, [or] subdivision.”56 While not
specifically mentioning the agricultural industry, the areas being
protected are rural unincorporated areas where farms and factory
farms are likely to be. In addition to the concerns of animal
welfare groups, environmental groups also take issue with the
law, as it precludes them from collecting environmental data on
water pollution.57
III. EVALUATING ALDF V. OTTER
Idaho’s “ag-gag” law prohibits recording at agricultural
production, as well as using misrepresentation to gain
employment at such facilities.58 It reads in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of interference with
agricultural production if the person knowingly: . . . obtains
employment with an agricultural production facility by force,
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or
other injury to the facility’s operations; [or] enters an
VICE NEWS (Jun. 9 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/north-carolinas-ag-gag-law-mightbe-the-worst-in-the-nation.
52. 2012 Census Highlights, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Hog_and_
Pig_Farming/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2015).
53. Verger, supra note 51.
54. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (West 2015).
55. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(b) (West 2015) (“A person is guilty of unlawfully
collecting resource data if he enter onto private openland and collects resource data
without: (i) [a]n ownership interest. . .or (ii) [w]ritten or verbal permission of the owner. . .
[.]”).
56. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(d)(ii) (West 2015).
57. Natasha Geiling, Wyoming Made It Illegal to Take A Photo of A Polluted Stream.
Now They’re Being Sued For It., THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 1 2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/10/01/3707798/wyoming-data-trespass-lawsuit/
58. IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(c-d) (West 2015).
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agricultural facility. . . and without owner’s express
consent. . .makes audio or video recording of the conduct of an
agricultural facilities’ operations[.]59
Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill issued his opinion in ALDF
v. Otter on August 3, 2015, holding that the law violates the
right to free speech and equal protection.60 The ruling deals a
significant blow to the agricultural interest groups that advance
these laws by asserting that they violate very important
constitutional protections.
A. First Amendment Violation
Typically, a First Amendment challenge proceeds in three
steps.61First, it must be determined whether the speech is
protected under the First Amendment.62 Next, it must be
determined what standards of review apply to the alleged
suppression of speech.63 Finally, the court must assess whether
the government’s justifications for restricting speech satisfy the
applicable standard of review.64 This section follows this
dichotomy and breaks down the ruling into its constitutional
principles, so that its reasoning may be applied to different
states’ laws.
B. Protected Speech
The court addressed whether §18-7042 criminalizes
protected speech.65 Previously, the determined it did in a ruling
on an earlier motion to dismiss.66 The court found the statute
prohibited protected speech in two ways.67 First, it forbade using
misrepresentations to gain employment with agricultural
facilities.68 Second, it prohibited unauthorized audiovisual
59. Id.
60. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2015)
[hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”].
67. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015).
68. Id.

208

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 13

recording of an agricultural production facilities’ operations.69
The court held that both of these were protected expressions
under the framework of the First Amendment.70
Lying to Gain Employment
In US v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor
Act,71 which made it a crime to lie about receiving military
medals.72 The Court found that the Stolen Valor Act constituted
a ban on speech without regard to any kind of material harm or
advantage.73 “Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent
any evidence that the speech was used to gain a material
advantage, it would give government a broad censorial
power.”74 specifically, it would “endorse government’s authority
to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are
punishable” akin to Oceania’s Ministry of Truth from George
Orwell’s novel 1984.75 However, the Court explained that “false
claims made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established
that the government may restrict speech without affronting the
First Amendment.”76
The Idaho District Court held that 18-4072 is similar to the
Stolen Valor Act in that it merely prohibits speech without
regard to the causal link to the harm.77 The State argued that
there is no direct harm from an undercover investigator’s
misrepresentations to gain access to the agricultural facility.78
The court disagreed. Instead, the harm that might arise would be
from the publication of a false story about the agricultural
facility.79 The court held that this is not the type of direct

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *5, 9.
Id.
U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012).
Id. at 2547-48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *5-6.
Id.
Id.
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material harm that Alvarez contemplates.80 Nor is it the type of
material advantage envisioned in Alvarez, as the undercover
investigators were not seeking the material gain from
employment, but rather the purposes of their misrepresentation
was to uncover animal abuse and other unsafe practices.81 The
courts asserted that this is the type of speech First Amendment
seeks to protect, as it exposes misconduct to the public and
facilitates dialogue on issues of public interest.82
The State further argued that the misrepresentation is
unprotected because it prohibited conduct, not speech.83 The
court ruled that no reading of the statute permits this view, as
misrepresentations cannot be construed to mean anything except
a form of speech, and any interpretation it only forbids trespass
and conversion is plainly erroneous from a statutory
interpretation view.84
Thus, the court finds that these misrepresentations are
entitled to some First Amendment protection.85 The primary
focus of this analysis was whether a material benefit or harm
arose from the lie. It would be difficult to argue that
employment has no material benefits, as employees are
compensated at the very least. But, the court seems to believe
that because these employment benefits are merely incidental to
animal rights activist’s actual goal of uncovering potential
animal abuse it is not the type of harm the Supreme Court was
concerned about, as in Alvarez.
Prohibiting Audiovisual Recordings
The court also found the ban on audiovisual recording to be
a regulation of protected speech.86 The State argued that the ban
is a regulation of conduct that does not affect speech.87 The
court disagreed because prohibiting recording would have the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6.
Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-22.
Id. at 1021.
Id.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1023.
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same effect as a ban on the publication of agricultural videos.88
Making an audiovisual recording is a corollary right to the
dissemination of such message, and is therefore protected under
First Amendment.89
Laws of General Applicability
The State argued that §18-7042 was not subject to the First
Amendment because it applied broadly, not just to individuals
conducting undercover investigations.90 In other words, it is a
law of general applicability.91 The State relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. to make this
argument.92 In Cohen, the Court held that the First Amendment
did not prohibit a confidential source from recovering damages
from a publisher revealing his identity when publisher had made
a promise of confidentiality.93 The Court reasoned that
“generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”94
The Idaho District Court distinguished §18-7042 from facts
of the Cohen case.95 First, Cohen involved promissory estoppel,
a common tort claim applied equally to all citizens.96 Thus, the
Court in Cohen was simply refusing to provide an exception in a
generally applicable law.97 However, the court in Otter asserted
that §18-7042 targeted undercover investigators who intend to
publish videos critical of the agricultural industry. 98 Such laws
“are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.”99 The legislative record reflects that it
was not meant to be generally applicable, but rather targeted
88. Id. at 1023
89. Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
90. Id. at 1019.
91. Id. at 1019.
92. Id.
93. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
94. Id. at 669
95. Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1019-20.
96. Id.
97. See Id.
98. Id. at 1020.
99. Id. at 1020 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n., 512 U.S. 622
at 640 (1994)).
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animal rights groups. Idaho State Senator Patrick likened the
animal rights investigators to “marauding invaders centuries ago
who swarmed into foreign territory and destroyed crops to starve
foes into submission,” and in defending the §18-7042, stated he
that “[t]his is the way you combat your enemies.”100 Undercover
investigators were also referred to as “terrorists,” “extremists,”
and “vigilantes.”101
The court held that the statute also differs from Cohen
because only compensatory damages were sought in that case.102
A violation of §18-7042 could result in either monetary damages
or state-imposed criminal sanctions, or both. 103 The court held
that the criminal sanctions place the statute out of Cohen
analysis, and under the purview of Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co.104 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a state
cannot make it a crime to publish lawfully obtained, truthful
material about a matter of public significance, “absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order.”105
Further, the Otter court stated that even if the law were
generally applicable that it does not mean it automatically
escape First Amendment scrutiny.106 A law prohibiting
demonstrations, for example, would not exempt it from First
Amendment analysis simply because it applies to everyone.107
Thus, the court finds that §18-7042 is not a general law of
applicability.
Strict Scrutiny Applies
Having determined that both the misrepresentation
provision and the audiovisual recording provision prohibit
speech protected by the First Amendment, the court turned to
what level of scrutiny to apply.108 The court held that strict
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *2.
Id.
Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1020.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979)).
Id.
Id.
See Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
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scrutiny applies because §18-7042 is both a content and
viewpoint restriction of speech.109
States may regulate protected speech, but generally any
regulation must be content neutral.110 “A regulation is contentbased if either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to
suppress particular ideas or if the regulation, by its very terms,
singles out particular content for differential treatment.”111 The
court held that, on its face, §18-7042 targeted one type of
speech, specifically “the conduct of an agricultural production
facility’s operations.”112 It created a prohibition differentiating
filming an agricultural production facility’s operations from all
other types of speech on agricultural production facilities that it
leaves unburdened.113 Thus, the statute discriminated based on
the content of the speech.114
The court further evidenced that the statute was contentbased by pointing to the legislative history and the restitution
provision.115The record is rife with instances of legislators
referring to animal rights activists in menacing terms, such as
“terrorists,” “extremists,” “vigilantes,” and “marauding
invaders.”116 These statements suggest that the law was enacted
with the specific purpose of targeting animal rights activists, and
thus serves the legislative purpose of silencing animal rights
activists’ speech. Further, the restitution provision, which
provides for double the loss for any violation of the statute, also
reinforces the content ruling.117 Effectively, the only way to
violate the audiovisual recording part of the statute and be liable
for damages would be to publish a video critical of the
agricultural production facility.118 Ironically, the more
successful that video is in animating public opinion against the
facility, the more the activist will be punished.119 Likewise, it
109.
110.
111.
2009).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1023-24.
Id.
Id. at 1023 (citing Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1024
Id. at 1024
Id. at 1024
Id. at 1024
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permits a facility owner to recover damages for defamation,
without proving the constitutional defamation standards.120
The court also holds that §18-7042 is a viewpoint-based
discrimination because, in effect, it privileges speech that is
supportive of the agricultural industry.121It allows job applicants
who make misrepresentations with the goal of praising the
agricultural facility to skate by unpunished, while penalizing
those that wish to expose abusive or unsafe conditions at the
facility.122 A person with the goal of praising the facility cannot
be punished by definition under the “double the loss” provision.
Additionally, since the law prohibits only unauthorized filming,
an owner is far more likely to permit filming that portrays the
facility in a positive light, rather than a negative.123Therefore,
because §18-7042 discriminates between speech based upon
both content and viewpoint, it is subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.124
The law appears to be inescapably a regulation of content
and viewpoint. It overtly targets animal rights groups’ message,
as clearly evidenced by the legislative history, and the means in
which they convey that message.
Fails Strict Scrutiny
The court ruled that §18-7042 cannot survive strict
scrutiny.125 “Content-based speech restrictions are generally
unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.”126 The proffered state interest in Otter
was protecting personal privacy and private property, which the
court does not find to be enough.127 The court reasoned that
agricultural production facilities are already heavily regulated,
and are subject to numerous regulations governing food and

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *9.
Id. (citing Turner, 501 U.S. at 680).
Id.
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animal safety.128 And given the public’s strong interest in the
safety of food production, the court did not see fit to afford the
industry extra protection from public scrutiny.129
Even if this was a compelling interest, the court does not
find §18-7042 to be narrowly tailored.130 The court pointed to
laws already in place that make it illegal to trespass and steal
property, as well as laws against fraud and defamation for any
false statements made about them.131 The court did not see a
need for agricultural production facilities to be afforded extra
protection when it would burden free speech.132 The court
expressed concern that §18-7042 not only targets animal rights
activists, but also fails to protect diligent and trusted longtime
employees.133If such an employee were to witness and film
abuse or safety violations, they would face jail time and owe
twice the economic loss the owner suffers, even if the video is
completely accurate.134This circumvents defamation law and
whistleblowing statutes by punishing employees for publishing
true and accurate recordings on matters of public concern.135
Because of this, the court saw a disconnect between the statute
and the State’s interest in protecting personal privacy and
private property.136 Further, the court did not see a reason why
counter speech would not be an effective method of refuting a
negative recording taken at an animal agricultural production
facility.137Thus, the court found that §18-7042 fails strict
scrutiny, and is therefore unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.138
Equal Protection Violation
The court also found that §18-7042 violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for many of the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *11.
Id.
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same reasons it violated the First Amendment freedom of speech
provision.139
Again, the court did not observe and the State did not
provide a reason why existing laws against trespass, fraud, and
defamation cannot adequately protect the interests of
agricultural production facilities.140 The existence of these laws
“necessarily casts doubt upon the proposition that [§18-7042]
could have rationally been intended to prevent those very same
abuses,” particularly where such action is out of desire to harm a
politically unpopular group.141 The State argues that agricultural
facilities deserve more protection because they are a major part
of Idaho’s economy, and are often targets of undercover
investigations.142 The court found this logic to be unconvincing,
as larger industries do not deserve more protection than smaller
industries and there is not a legitimate government interest in
protecting a powerful industry, which produces the public’s food
supply, from public scrutiny.143 Because there was not a
legitimate reason for §18-7042, the Otter court held that it could
not even pass rational basis review.144
The State argued that §18-7042 cannot violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it did not create an impermissible
classification.145 An improper classification may be created in
three ways: showing the law discriminates on its face; showing
that the law is applied in a discriminatory manner; or by
showing that the law was enacted with discriminatory
purpose.146The court found that law discriminates both on its
face and by its purpose.147 §18-7042 discriminates on its face
because it discriminates between whistleblowers in the
agricultural industry and whistleblowers in other industries.148It
discriminated in its purpose because it was enacted with the
139.
140.
141.
(1973)).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34
Id. at 12.
Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13 (citing Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
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discriminatory to silence animal rights activists who conduct
undercover investigations in the agricultural industry.149
The court also emphasized that when a state discriminates
based on the exercise of fundamental right, strict scrutiny may
apply.150 §18-7042 discriminated based on the content of
speech.151 “Under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention
the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of
a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, and deny use
to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views.”152 Thus, §18-7042 cannot stand under the Equal
Protection Clause because it classifies activities protected by the
First Amendment based on content.153 The Otter court did not
explicitly hold that strict scrutiny applied, likely because it was
unnecessary as they held the statute was not even permissible
under rational basis. Clearly, the district court wanted to send a
strong message that it believes such laws are highly
unconstitutional and are bad policy. It plainly does this by ruling
§18-7042 cannot even pass the minimal burden of rational basis
review.
In sum, the Otter held that §18-7042 violates both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The case is currently on appeal to
the 9th Circuit.154 If upheld, this challenge could establish
significant precedent to challenge “ag-gag” laws in other states.
Regardless of the outcome, Ottter’s reasoning could still have
implications in other jurisdictions. The following section
explores that possibility.
IV. APPLYING THE RULING
The ruling in Otter casts doubt up on many states’ “ag-gag”
laws, particularly those that criminalize misrepresentations to
gain access and audiovisual recordings on agricultural facilities,
as the Idaho law did. However, applying the Otter decision to
149. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13; See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
150. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13 (citing City of Cleburne, TX. v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440).
151. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
152. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13 (citing Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
153. Id. at 14.
154. ALDF et al. v. Wasden, No. 15-35950 (9th Cir. filed Dec. 14, 2015).
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“ag-gag” laws requiring rapid reporting or are broad ban type
statutes is not as straightforward because they are fundamentally
different from the earlier ag-gag laws.
A. No Recording Statutes
The Otter ruling applies fairly significantly to states’
statutes forbidding audiovisual recording on agricultural
production facilities, as the overturned Idaho statute also
explicitly banned recording.155 However, a key difference
between the first wave states’ statutes is that Idaho’s statute
forbids both unauthorized audiovisual recording on, and lying to
gain access to, agricultural production facilities156, whereas the
first wave of ag-gag statutes, only forbid unauthorized
audiovisual recording.157 Additionally, the first wave statutes
vary from each other and the Idaho statute as to the level of
intent required for a violation.158
Montana, Kansas
Montana’s statute makes it a crime “to enter an animal
facility to take pictures by photograph, video, camera, or other
means with the intent to commit criminal defamation” without
the authorization of the owner and with intent to damage the
enterprise.159 Under the Otter ruling and reasoning, Montana’s
statute is closer to being content neutral, but is still likely
viewpoint-based discrimination. Unlike Idaho’s statute,
Montana’s statute does not limits its scope to the “agricultural
facilities’ operations,”160 but rather it extends to all audiovisual
recordings on the facility.161 This was a major point of
contention for the court because it differentiates based on the
content of speech by forbidding audiovisual recording of only
155. IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015).
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
158. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015); supra notes 19-28 and
accompanying text.
159. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(3)(e) (West 2015)
160. IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(d) (West 2015).
161. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015).
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certain areas of agricultural production facilities.162 However,
Montana’s statute similarly bases recovery on the amount of
damages that occur,163 which would likely be the result of a
negative publication.164 Thus, Montana’s statute is a contentbased discrimination in that regard.
Montana’s statute would likely be viewpoint discrimination
under Otter, because it specifically punishes speech that is
unpraiseworthy of an agricultural facility due to its intent to
damage language. Meanwhile, it leaves unpunished speech that
would praise the facility and its practices.165 Indeed, similar to
Otter, the owner has the right to approve any recording, and it is
unlikely that an owner would approve of an audiovisual
recording that portrays the facility in a negative light. 166 The
statute by its term cannot simply be applied to someone who
would portray the facility in a positive light; it could only apply
to someone with the intent to damage the facility. Arguably that
is the point a defamation suit, to stop untruthful, negative view
of a person or entity. It is harder to argue that defamation applies
to an unaltered, unfabricated audiovisual recording. Thus, the
statute would likely be subject to strict scrutiny under the
framework First Amendment because it differentiates between
positive and negative viewpoints.
The Kansas statue excludes the criminal defamation
standard present in the Montana statute, but includes the same
“intent damage the enterprise” language.167 It similarly does not
single out a type of recording forbidden on agricultural
facilities.168 The listed violation level, a class A, nonperson
misdemeanor, has been repealed,169 but the punishment was
formerly no more than a year in jail or a fine not exceeding
$2500, or both.170 So, the punishment was not based upon the
amount of damages caused and would not be affected, at least
162. See supra notes 102-6 and accompanying text.
163. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104 (West 2015).
164. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
165. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015).
166. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
167. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30103(2)(e) (West 2015).
168. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015).
169. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4502 (West 2015).
170. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4503a available at
http://law.justia.com/codes/kansas/2006/chapter21/statute_11828.html.
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from statutory view, by the amount of damages resulting from a
publication. This makes the Kansas’ statute fairly content
neutral under the analysis of Otter. Yet, the intent to damage
language, likely makes this statute a viewpoint-based
discrimination for the same reasons it did for Montana’s
statute.171 Thus, Kansas’ statute would likely be subject to strict
scrutiny.
North Dakota
The North Dakota statute is more akin to the Idaho statute
in that neither requires a specific intent.172 Idaho does have the
broader intent language by requiring that person knowingly
violated statute, however, the North Dakota statute is completely
devoid of intent language,173 making it look more like a strictliability offense.
North Dakota’s statute is not likely a content-based
restriction. It does not single out any particular part of
agricultural production facilities; it appears to be a ban on all
unauthorized recording.174 The punishment is not based on
restitution for the damages that would flow from a negative
publication, instead the listed punishment level is a class B
misdemeanor,175 which is punishable by a maximum penalty of
thirty-day imprisonment, a fine $1500, or both.176 Thus, the
statute appears to be content neutral.
North Dakota’s statute may also be viewpoint neutral. It
does not appear to differentiate between positive and negative
viewpoints through its punishments, as the Idaho statute.177 It
does not limit enforcement to only those with intent to damage
as the Montana and Kansas statutes do either.178 However, it still
allows the owner to authorize what may and may not be

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra text accompanying note 158.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015).
Id.; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-04 (West 2015).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32.01(6) (West 2015).
Supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
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recorded.179 The court in Otter was concerned with turning
agricultural facility owners into “state-backed” censors,180 but it
is unclear if this factor alone is enough to make it a viewpoint
discrimination. It relies on the reasonable assumption that an
agricultural facility owner would not approve of recordings
which would portray a facility in a negative light. 181 Thus, North
Dakota’s statute seems to be the closest in avoiding strict
scrutiny as to the free speech challenge among the first wave of
ag-gag laws.
B. Statutes Criminalizing Misrepresentation
The Idaho statute overturned in Otter was part of the
second wave of ag-gag laws, along with Iowa and Utah that
included a provision criminalizing misrepresentations to gain
access to agricultural facilities.182 Iowa’s statute focuses only on
misrepresentations used to gain access to agricultural production
facilities, whether part of an employment application or
otherwise.183 However, Utah and Idaho not only make it a crime
to make a misrepresentation to gain access to an agricultural
production facility, but also to make an audiovisual recording on
the premises.184 The constitutionality of the Iowa and Utah’s
statutes depends largely upon whether misrepresentations are
protected speech. The Otter court found the “misrepresentation
to gain employment” provision of the Idaho statute to be
protected speech because the misrepresentation is not linked to
the envisioned direct harm done by it, or the material advantage
gained.185
Indeed, the same analysis used in Otter can apply to Iowa
and Utah’s statutes. The material harm would not arise from an
animal investigator lying to gain employment.186 Rather, the
harm would be from the publication of those recordings, which
179. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015).
180. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *9.
181. See id.
182. Supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
183. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A. (West 2015
184. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6112(2) (West 2015).
185. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
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the Otter court argues, is not the direct type of material harm
required to prohibit speech.187 The court in Otter argues that the
material gain is different in these cases from the type in Alvarez,
where it was stated that false claims “made to secure money or
other valuable consideration, say offers of employment,” are not
protected.188 The court states that what is sought and obtained by
animal rights activists’ misrepresentations is being able to
record, undercover, at animal production facilities, not the
material gains of employment.189 Given the indirectness of the
harm and gain, Iowa and Utah’s statutes likely criminalize
protected speech similar to the Idaho statute.
However, Iowa and Utah’s statutes are likely closer to
avoiding strict scrutiny because their punishments are not linked
to the damages a negative publication would cause like the
Idaho statute did with language providing for an award “twice
the value of the damage resulting from a violation.”190 A
violation of the Utah and the Iowa code would only result in a
fine and/or prison time.191 This means a violation would not
discriminate between the content of a message. Any
unauthorized recording would be equally punishable. Thus, it is
likely a content neutral law. The only possible viewpoint
discrimination would be that it allows the owner to authorize
what recording is permissible, and again it is unlikely that he
would authorize any recording that portrays the facility in a
negative light. It is unclear whether this alone could establish a
viewpoint-discrimination argument, therefore Utah and Iowa
may be able to avoid strict scrutiny based on the logic of the
Otter ruling.
C. Rapid Reporting Statutes
It is difficult to compare rapid reporting statutes to the
Idaho statute or any of the other first or second wave “ag-gag”
statutes because they are so fundamentally different in the way
187. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
188. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *6.
189. Id.
190. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (West 2015).
191. IOWA CODE ANN. 903.1 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (West
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301 (West 2015).
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they attempt to limit recording at agricultural facilities. Indeed,
laws which impose a duty to report are exceedingly rare, usually
only reserved for serious felonies such as child abuse.192
Missouri’s statute provides that when “[anyone] makes a digital
recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm animal
subjected to abuse or neglect. . .[there is] a duty to submit such
videotape or digital recording with twenty-four hours.”193 No
such provision expressly prohibiting audiovisual recordings or
lying to gain access to agricultural facilities is present.194As
such, the constitutional free speech analysis of Otter does not
significantly apply.
However, rapid reporting statutes may be vulnerable to an
Equal Protection claim because it singles out the agricultural
industry for special protection and treatment. As such, the
statute may create an improper classification on its face, by
providing a protection to an industry which others do not enjoy.
However, it is unclear whether a court would apply any
increased level of scrutiny. Animal investigators are not
considered a suspect class. The only argument for would be that
it is discriminated based on the exercise of fundamental right, as
was argued in Otter.195
Rapid reporting statutes prevent animal investigators from
compiling a record of evidence because the statute requires that
they report the first instance of abuse almost immediately, likely
outing themselves as an investigator because the agency
receiving the recording will undoubtedly contact the facility
about the violation. This makes it next to impossible to establish
a pattern of abuse.196 Agricultural facility owners will not face
tough consequences, as they probably will only be fined small
amounts or have to fire some employees.197 There will not be
large economic penalties that act as deterrents as there have been
with the higher profile investigations.198 Thus, the agricultural
industry is shielded in that regard where as other industries may
not be. The agricultural industry is subject to more public
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Shea, supra note 31, at 364.
MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015).
Id.
Supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text
Shea, supra note 31, at 339.
Shea, supra note 31, at 364.
Shea, supra note 31, at 364.
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scrutiny than other industries, but as the court points out in
Otter, this does not mean it should be offered more protection,
as food production is a matter of public interest.199 Even so,
rapid reporting statutes appear to be the closest type of “ag-gag”
law that can avoid strict scrutiny.
D. Broad Bans to Data Collection
North Carolina’s statute, which became effective on
January 1, 2016,200 illustrates the new trend in limiting
undercover investigative reporting. Undercover investigations of
North Carolina’s agricultural and food industry have had a
major impact in the recent past.201 Famously, in 1992, two
undercover reporters working for ABC posed as employees at
Food Lion supermarkets in North Carolina.202 The reporters
secretly recorded unsanitary food handling practices, and later
used the footage in a broadcast report on PrimeTime Live.203 The
Fourth Circuit found that the reporters breached their duty of
loyalty to Food Lion by surreptitiously filming these practices
with adverse intent to serve another employer.204 More recently,
in 2012, an undercover investigator exposed animal abuse on a
Butterball turkey farm, resulting in six workers being charged in
addition to a state worker who tipped off the facility before it
was raided by authorities.205 Butterball accounts for about
twenty percent of the turkey production in the US.206 Seemingly
in response to the Butterball investigation, a bill was introduced
in 2013 in the North Carolina Senate, which criminalized lying
to gain access and audiovisual recording at any employer’s
199. Supra note 133-134 and accompanying text.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2 (West 2015).
201. See Greg Toppo, N.C. poultry worker arrested after video shows him stomping,
throwing chickens, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2015)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/09/mercy-for-animals-north-carolinachicken-processing-abuse/77049796/.
202. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 516.
205. Cindy Galli, Butterball Workers Arrested on Animal Cruelty Charges, ABC
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2012) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/butterball-workers-arrested-animalcruelty-charges/story?id=15637180 .
206. Id.

224

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 13

facility.207 This bill was not passed by adjournment of the 2013
session, effectively defeating the bill. 208 It is against this
backdrop that North Carolina’s property protection act came to
pass.
North Carolina’s property protection act prohibits an
employee from intentionally entering nonpublic areas for a
reason “other than seeking or holding employment”, and then
without authorization, “recording images or sounds occurring in
the premises”, and using those sounds to breach the person’s
duty of loyalty to the employer.209 This provision seeks to limit
undercover investigations by those who have taken a job to
record images, as their intent will always to some degree be
related to their investigation. Representative John Szoka, a
primary sponsor of the bill, stated that it protects
whistleblowers, but at the same time targets employees who are
hired under false pretenses, and seek to record breaking their
duty of loyalty to the employer.210
Setting aside undercover investigators, it is very unclear
how this law protects whistleblowers. There seems to be two
possibilities: the intent language211 and the protections vaguely
pointing to other areas of law.212 First, the intent language may
protect employee whistleblower when the recording pertains to
the employee’s job, as employees undoubtedly have reason to
enter nonpublic areas when it pertains to their job. However, it
does not necessarily follow that this would always protect the
employee. An employee could become aware of an illegal act
his employer is doing in a different area, not a part of
employee’s job. If the employee wanted to expose this, it
appears he could be liable under the statute. Second, the statute
vaguely states that that it does not diminish protections provided
to employees under “Article 21 of Chapter 95 or Article 14 of
207. S. Res. 648, 2012-2013 Legis. (N.C. 2013).
208. Bydan Flynn, 2013 Legislative Season Ends with ‘Ag-Gag’ Bills Defeated in 11
States, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 30, 2013)
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/07/2013-legislative-season-ends-with-ag-gag-billsdefeated-in-11-states/#.Vp7N1CorKhc.
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(b)(2) (West 2015).
210. NC House debate 4-22-2015 at1:17:20 available at
http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/20152016%20Session/Audio%20Archives/2015/04-22-2015.mp3.
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(b)(2) (West 2015).
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(e) (West 2015).
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Chapter 126 of the General Statutes, nor may any party who is
covered by these articles be liable under this section.”213 Article
14 of Chapter 126 of the General Statutes refers to
whistleblowing in the public matters, and has nothing to do with
cases of private enterprise whistleblowing.214 Article 21 of
Chapter 95 lists a number of types of employees whom may not
be discriminated against if they do certain acts or have certain
characteristics , meaning they cannot be fired or other
employment action be taken bases upon those acts or
characteristics. However, none of these preclude an employee
being sued for whistleblowing.215
When read with the last part of the vague exceptions
section, “nor may any party who is covered by these articles be
liable under this section” this becomes even more baffling. Take
for example, NC ST § 95-28.1 listed under Article 21 of Chapter
95.216 NC ST § 95-28.1 provides that employers shall not
discriminate making employment decisions on account of the
fact a person possesses the sickle cell trait. So, since this
“covers” people with the sickle cell trait, it appears that people
with sickle cell anemia could not be found liable under North
Carolina’s property protection act, and could conceivably do any
undercover investigation they desired without repercussion.
Leaving aside this anecdote, it emphasizes that parts of this bill
are poorly conceived.
A few key points which played a part in overturning
Idaho’s ag-gag law in Otter are also present in North Carolina’s
property protection act. First, the punishment of the North
Carolina’s act is based upon how much damage is caused to the
business, as the remedy it provides for is compensatory
damages.217 Much like Idaho’s law,218 the only conceivable way
to damage and thus owe compensatory damages to a business is
by recording something on the premises critical of the business
somehow injuring the business’ reputation and costing it money.
A video praising a business would not cost them money, or
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 126-14 (West 2015).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-21-241 (West 2015).
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(d)(2) (West 2015).
See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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trigger compensatory damages in any conceivable way.
Therefore, this is a viewpoint discrimination because through its
punishment it permits one view while silencing another.
Viewpoint discrimination is subject to the most exacting
scrutiny, and is rarely permissible.
Second, while not explicit in the text of the statute, there is
ample external evidence that suggests that the statute was
enacted with purpose of protecting the agricultural industry. The
biggest piece of evidence would simply be the environment that
gave rise to the bill.219 Governor McCrory in his veto message
was concerned that bill did not give adequate protection to
“honest employees,” but remarked that undercover investigation
was indeed a problem in the agricultural industry in particular.220
North Carolina’s property protection act is likely subject to
strict scrutiny under the reasoning of the Otter ruling because
the damages are based upon the publication being negative, and
there is ample evidence to suggest that this is a veiled attempt at
targeting animal rights activists.
V. CONCLUSION
Rapid reporting statutes and content and viewpoint neutral
recording ban statutes, like that in North Dakota, appear to be
closest to avoiding strict scrutiny under the Otter ruling.
However, both may be vulnerable to equal protection claims
because they single out the agricultural industry for protection,
while others are not. Yet, it would be difficult to apply anything
except rational basis review, as there is not likely a suspect class
being discriminated against. The Otter court only applied
rational basis review, but argued it could apply strict scrutiny if
the statute was discriminated based on a fundamental right.221
For states pondering implementing “ag-gag” statutes, these
would probably be the safest for the states to avoid them being
challenged.
But, as a policy matter, states should not implement these
laws. They are too much of an onerous burden on the right to
219. See supra notes 191-199 and accompanying text.
220. Pat McCrory, McCrory Veto Message, (May 29, 2015), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/h405Veto/letter.pdf.
221. Supra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
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free speech, not only of animal rights activists, but news
gathering in general. The public relies on reporters and their
ability investigate to inform them of potential wrongdoings. An
industry that serves public needs, such as the agricultural
industry, particularly should not be shielded from the public eye.
The reasons that give rise to “ag-gag” laws are not
completely unreasonable. It is no doubt a burden for the industry
to be subject to investigation and public scrutiny. And
realistically, animal slaughter is a messy and often brutal process
even when properly done. Yet, this should not preclude the
industry from public scrutiny and investigation. These
investigations continually turn up instances of animal cruelty
and abuse, which are in fact crimes. It is difficult to reconcile
why an industry should be immune not only from public
scrutiny, but from prosecution under laws they have been
demonstrated to frequently break. And even beyond animal
cruelty, an industry that produces food for the public should not
be entirely shielded from it for any number of health concerns.
What should logically arise from these investigations is more
transparency, but instead the public is seeing far less.

